Failure-to-Protect
Addressing allegations of failure-to-protect is crucial to ensuring the safety and well-being of incarcerated individuals. The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty on prison officials to protect incarcerated individuals from violence at the hands of other incarcerated individuals. PRISM is dedicated to advocating for those who have been assaulted due to the failure of DOC officials, seeking justice and accountability to ensure the protection of individuals while in custody.
References
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)
In 𝘍𝘢𝘳𝘮𝘦𝘳 𝘷. 𝘉𝘳𝘦𝘯𝘯𝘢𝘯, the Supreme Court ruled that prison officials have a duty under the Eighth Amendment to protect incarcerated individuals from violence by other incarcerated persons. To prove failure to protect, two conditions must be met. Firstly, the deprivation must be objectively, sufficiently serious, meaning the individual was exposed to a substantial risk of serious harm. This requires demonstrating a serious physical or emotional injury or a substantial risk of such harm. Secondly, the officials must have acted with deliberate indifference, meaning they were aware of the risk and disregarded it. Deliberate indifference is more than negligence; it involves knowing of a risk and disregarding it. Officials cannot avoid liability by claiming ignorance of an obvious risk.
Makdessi v. Fields, 789 F.3d 126 (4th Cir. 2015)
In 𝘔𝘢𝘬𝘥𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘪 𝘷. 𝘍𝘪𝘦𝘭𝘥𝘴, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals considered several key factors to establish deliberate indifference. They clarified that deliberate indifference involves more than negligence but less than purposeful harm, lying between recklessness and purpose or knowledge. The Court emphasized that prison officials cannot ignore obvious risks and may be held liable if they fail to act despite knowing the risk. Officials can rebut the charge by showing they were unaware of the danger or believed the risk was insubstantial, but without successful rebuttal, they may be held liable for obvious risks they should have known about. The Court also highlighted that actual knowledge of risks can be inferred from the circumstances. In Makdessi’s case, despite his complaints and the obvious risk, prison officials did not take action to protect him, indicating a potential case of deliberate indifference. The Court’s decision in 𝘔𝘢𝘬𝘥𝘦𝘴𝘴𝘪 𝘷. 𝘍𝘪𝘦𝘭𝘥𝘴 underscores the importance of officials’ duty to protect incarcerated individuals from harm, especially vulnerable ones, and the need to consider the obviousness of risks in deliberate indifference cases.
